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LAW, TORTURE, AND THE “TASK OF THE 
GOOD LAWYER” —MUKASEY AGONISTES 
Daniel Kanstroom*
Abstract: Following September 11, 2001, there was a challenge to the role 
of law as a regulator of military action and executive power. Government 
lawyers produced legal interpretations designed to authorize, legitimize, 
and facilitate interrogation tactics widely considered to be illegal. This 
raises a fundamental question: how should law respond to such flawed in-
terpretation and its consequences, even if the ends might have seemed 
necessary or just? This Symposium examines deep tensions between 
competing visions of the rule of law and the role of lawyers. Spurred by a 
controversy over the selection of then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
as commencement speaker, the goal was to examine such basic and chal-
lenging questions. What is the optimal relationship among policy, legal 
interpretation, and ethics? What ethical norms should guide government 
lawyers? Attorney General Mukasey agreed to publish his commencement 
address as part of the Symposium. Participants were asked to read it and, 
if they wished, to use it as a touchstone for their analyses of the questions 
it raised. 
States face immense difficulties in modern times in protecting their communi-
ties from terrorist violence. . . . That must not, however, call into question the 
absolute nature of [the prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment]. 
—The European Court of Human Rights1
History will not judge this kindly. 
—Attorney General John Ashcroft2
 “Security,” wrote Justice Robert Jackson, “is like liberty in that 
many are the crimes committed in its name.”3 What if the same were 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor and Director, Boston College Law School Human Rights Program. Thanks 
to Paolo Barrozo, Kent Greenfield, Greg Kalscheur, Mary-Rose Papandrea, and Zyg Plater 
for helpful comments. 
1 Saadi v. Italy, Appl. No. 37201/06 at para. 137, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008). 
2 Jan Crawford Greenburg et al., Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved “Enhanced Interroga-
tion,” ABC News.com, Apr. 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/Story?id= 
4583256&page=4. 
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true of law? Consider this simplified scenario: John Smith is a lawyer 
with experience in criminal and tax matters. A former client comes to 
him and says that he has just lost his job. He is in absolutely desperate 
circumstances: he is about to lose his home; his children need new 
clothes; his wife is pregnant with another child. He has just realized 
that, in addition to everything else, he must pay $1000 with his income 
tax return. Smith tells the client that he does not actually have to pay 
the taxes and he writes a long, well-cited legal memorandum explain-
ing why. “In fact,” says Smith, “you should file a return that claims a 
$1000 refund and pocket the money. Consider it a loan from the gov-
ernment.” “Is that legal?” asks the client, “I don’t want to do anything 
illegal.” “Don’t worry,” says Smith, “I am your lawyer. I know tax law in 
all its complexities and I am telling you, in writing, that it’s legal. Fur-
thermore, you need to do it in order to protect your family. So it is not 
only legal; it’s right and necessary.” 
 When the client gets prosecuted, do you think the case should be 
dismissed? If not, should he be able to argue to a jury that he was mis-
led so profoundly that it renders him not guilty? And what of Smith? 
Should he be ethically sanctioned? Prosecuted? 
 One immediate consequence of the September 11, 2001 attacks was 
a challenge to the role of law—especially international humanitarian and 
human rights law—as a regulator of military action and executive power. 
This challenge targeted both the law’s ability to punish transgressions, as 
well as the law’s role in conceptualizing the limits of power. Indeed, a 
mere three days after the attacks, Stewart Baker, the former general 
counsel of the National Security Agency, said, “We have judicialized more 
aspects of human behavior than any civilization in history, and we may 
have come to the limit of that.”4 Soon thereafter, Colonel Charles J. 
Dunlap, Jr., provocatively asked whether so-called “lawfare” and the 
norms of international law were, “undercutting the ability of the U.S. to 
conduct effective military interventions?”5 He further questioned 
whether law was, “becoming a vehicle to exploit American values in ways 
                                                                                                                      
3 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) ( Jackson, J., dis-
senting). 
4 John Lancaster & Susan Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategy for Coping with Terrorists, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 14, 2001, at A09. 
5 Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S. Air Force, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving 
Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Nov. 29–30, 2001) (working paper, on file with 
the Harvard University Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, National Security and Human 
Rights Program), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Pa- 
pers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
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that actually increase risks to civilians,” and whether law might be, “more 
of the problem in modern war instead of part of the solution?”6
 One possible solution, it turned out, was to maintain the form of 
legality while using complicated interpretations to achieve results that 
seemed consonant with the executive’s conception of security needs. 
These methods, along with remarkably broad assertions of executive 
authority, became dominant aspects of politico-legal discourse in the 
following seven years of the Bush administration. They supported many 
of the Bush administration’s tactics in the “War on Terror,” including 
the designation and detention of so-called unlawful or enemy combat-
ants, the establishment of “black sites” for detention outside the United 
States, the military tribunals at Guantánamo Bay, unlawful rendition, 
and the use of harsh interrogation methods such as waterboarding. 
 Some, including former Vice President Dick Cheney, are unre-
pentant; indeed, they are proud. As he recently stated, 
When we get people who are more concerned about reading 
the rights to an al Qaeda terrorist than they are with protect-
ing the United States against people who are absolutely com-
mitted to do anything they can to kill Americans, then I worry 
. . . . If it hadn’t been for what we did—with respect to the . . . 
enhanced interrogation techniques for high-value detainees 
. . . we would have been attacked again.7
Others, like President Barack Obama, argue that what is at stake is not 
only national security, but a fundamental clash of values that undergird 
legal and constitutional questions. As President Obama put it in March, 
2009, “I think that Vice President Cheney has been at the head of a 
movement whose notion is somehow that we can’t reconcile our core 
values, our Constitution, our belief that we don’t torture, with our na-
tional security interests . . . .”8
 This is a powerful way to frame the dispute, but it is not completely 
accurate. The troubling reason why is that some lawyers in the Depart-
ment of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) apparently did 
seek to reconcile core values and the Constitution with national secu-
rity. Jay Bybee, John Yoo, and others produced a superficially plausible 
                                                                                                                      
6 Id. 
7 John F. Harris et al., Cheney Warns of New Attacks, Politico, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www. 
politico.com/news/stories/0209/18390.html. 
8 60 Minutes: Obama on AIG Rage, Recession, Challenges (CBS television broadcast Mar. 22, 
2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/18/60minutes/main4873938. 
shtml. 
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legal interpretation that sought to authorize, legitimize, and facilitate a 
range of interrogation tactics widely considered to be illegal torture.9 
This raises a fundamental question: how should law respond to its own 
transgression by flawed interpretation and reckless advice? Put another 
way, how should law respond to the misuse of legal reasoning to author-
ize unlawful actions even if the ends might seem necessary or just? 
 The problem is greater than the Bybee and Yoo “torture memos.” 
Indeed, as I write this Introduction, the revelations come faster than 
ever. An April 2009 New York Times article, contradicting prior asser-
tions of the rarity of waterboarding, reports that waterboarding was in 
fact used hundreds of times on two terrorism suspects.10
 One cannot overstate the concern caused by such practices across 
the ideological spectrum. Professor Douglas Kmiec, former head of the 
OLC during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, is now 
calling for: 
[A] Nuremberg-style citizen-conducted ethics inquiry in which 
all of the opinion writers—and the opinion demanders in the 
Pentagon and former White House—would be required to 
self-critique why the Nation they most assuredly would say they 
love is today embarrassed if not appalled by what was author-
ized.11
Many others demand criminal prosecutions of the lawyers. As David 
Cole argues, “These documents are irrefutable evidence that govern-
ment officials, including [OLC] lawyers . . . set out to manipulate the 
law to reach repugnant, illegal results . . . .”12
 The concern is not just about torture; it is about a pattern of legal 
advice given by those described by Prof. Kmiec as, “either too young to 
have perspective, too academic to have practical wisdom, or too politi-
cal to be capable of judgment.”13 It has now been widely reported that 
other secret memos issued to the CIA in 2003 and 2004 endorsed wa-
terboarding and a range of other harsh techniques.14 The concern at 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Daniel Kanstroom, On “Waterboarding”: Legal Interpretation and the Continuing 
Struggle for Human Rights, 32 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 203, 207–11 (2009). 
10 See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y Times, Apr. 19, 2009, 
at A1. 
11 Douglas W. Kmiec, Editorial, Obama’s Realism, N.Y Times.com, Apr. 16, 2009, http:// 
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/the-memos-torture-redefined/#douglas. 
12 David Cole, Editorial, Macabre and Excruciating, N.Y Times.com, Apr. 16, 2009, http:// 
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/the-memos-torture-redefined/#douglas. 
13 Kmiec, supra note 11. 
14 See Joby Warrick, CIA Tactics Endorsed in Secret Memos, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1. 
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the CIA, as one lawyer put it, was, “whether we had enough ‘top 
cover.’”15 This is a critical point: many in the Bush administration, rang-
ing from the interrogators themselves all the way up to Secretary of 
State Condoleeza Rice, were deeply concerned about whether the 
harsh measures were lawful. The resulting legal analyses were designed 
to put their minds at ease on that score, and to encourage them to go 
forward with the program.16 This required exceptionally detailed and 
convincing legal work, because many in the Bush administration had 
deep qualms. As ABC News reported, after the capture of Abu Zubay-
dah, George Tenet proposed to combine certain “enhanced” tech-
niques in a single interrogation plan. Vice President Cheney reportedly 
approved, but Attorney General John Ashcroft argued that while the 
tactics may have been legal, senior advisers should not be involved in 
the grim details. As he rather presciently worried, “History will not 
judge this kindly.”17
 A report by the International Committee of the Red Cross, ob-
tained by Mark Danner,18 calls even Attorney General Ashcroft’s legal 
conclusions into question. It graphically describes a range of brutal— 
and arguably illegal—interrogation tactics undertaken by the CIA.19 
The report documents not only waterboarding (described as “suffoca-
tion by water poured over a cloth placed over the nose and mouth”) 
but also: 
• Prolonged stress standing position, naked, held with the 
arms extended and chained above the head. 
• Beatings by use of a collar held around the detainees’ neck 
and used to forcefully bang the head and body against the 
wall. 
• Beating and kicking, including slapping, punching, and 
kicking to the body and face. 
• Confinement in a box to severely restrict movement 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. 
16 See id. 
17 Greenburg et al., supra note 2. See generally Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside 
Story on How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals (2008). 
18 This Report was apparently sent to the U.S. government in February, 2007. See Mark 
Danner, The Red Cross Torture Report: What It Means, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Apr. 30, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22614.
19 See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treat-
ment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody (2007), available at http:// 
www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf. 
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• Prolonged nudity . . . last[ing] for periods ranging from sev-
eral weeks to several months. 
• Sleep deprivation . . . through use of forced stress positions 
(standing or sitting), cold water and use of repetitive loud 
noise or music. 
• Exposure to cold temperature . . . especially via cold cells 
and interrogation rooms, and . . . by the use of cold water 
poured over the body or . . . held around the body by means 
of a plastic sheet to create an immersion bath with just the 
head out of water. 
• Prolonged shackling of hands and/or feet. 
• Threats of ill-treatment to the detainee and/or his family. 
• Forced shaving of the head and beard. 
• Deprivation/restricted provision of solid food from 3 days to 
1 month after arrest.20 
 Precious few, if any, credible legal scholars now seek to defend the 
reasoning of the torture memos. Indeed, the authors may be called 
upon to defend their work in courts far more serious and formal than 
those of public and scholarly opinion.21 Criminal proceedings have be-
gun in Spain against six former Bush administration officials, including 
Jay Bybee and John Yoo,22 for torturing detainees in Guantánamo Bay. 
Baltasar Garzón, known as a “counter-terrorism judge,” has reportedly 
referred the case to the chief prosecutor.23 Though the latter seems 
disinclined to proceed as of this writing, court documents allege that, 
without the legal advice given in internal administration memos, “it 
would have been impossible to structure a legal framework that sup-
ported what happened [in Guantánamo].”24
 Further, the chair of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick 
Leahy, has recently called for a “non-partisan commission of inquiry” to 
investigate, “how our detention policies and practices . . . have seriously 
                                                                                                                      
20 Id. at 8–9. 
21 It is quite possible that similar work product still remains hidden from public scru-
tiny. 
22 The others are Alberto Gonzales, David Addington, Douglas Feith, and William 
Haynes. See Julian Border & Dale Fuchs, Spanish Judge to Hear Torture Case Against Six Bush 
Officials, Observer, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/29/guan- 
tanamo-bay-torture-inquiry. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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eroded fundamental American principles of the rule of law.”25 As 
Leahy piquantly noted, “We cannot turn the page unless we read the 
page.”26
 This Symposium, which took place at Boston College Law School in 
October 2008, aimed to examine these deep underlying tensions be-
tween two competing visions of the rule of law and the role of lawyers. It 
was spurred by a controversy that had engulfed the law school over the 
selection of Attorney General Michael Mukasey as commencement 
speaker. That controversy mostly involved Attorney General Mukasey’s 
legal positions regarding torture and waterboarding, subjects that I have 
addressed in a separate article that is being re-published as part of this 
Symposium.27 The main goal of the Symposium was not to re-visit the 
controversy surrounding the selection of Attorney General Mukasey as a 
speaker. The hope, rather, was to engage—on the merits—some of the 
most basic and challenging questions of legal ethics and lawyering 
raised by the Attorney General: 
• What is the optimal relationship among policy, legal interpreta-
tion, and ethics? 
• What does (or should) it mean to be an “aggressive” lawyer in 
this context? 
• What ethical norms should guide government lawyers in par-
ticular? 
• What message should a law faculty send to our students? 
 Attorney General Mukasey was cordially invited to attend, with as-
surances that the aim of the Symposium was to engage—as dispassion-
ately, rationally, and respectfully as possible—with the range of ques-
tions described above.28 Unfortunately, he declined. Nevertheless, he 
did agree to publish a version of his commencement address as part of 
the Symposium. Participants were asked to read it and, if they wished, 
to use it as a touchstone for their analyses. To help situate the reader, 
what follows is a very brief exegesis of what I believe are the major 
points raised by the Attorney General. 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Hearing on Getting to the Truth Through a Nonpartisan Commission of Inquiry, 111th 
Cong. __ (2009) (statement Of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.), avail-
able at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200903/030409a.html. 
26 Id. 
27 See generally Kanstroom, supra note 9. 
28 The organizers also sought, without success, to invite speakers who would defend 
the OLC interpretations. 
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 Attorney General Mukasey made two related, basic jurisprudential 
assertions about the nature of law. First, that there is a clear divide be-
tween morality and the law. As he put it, echoing many legal positivists: 
“It is the task of the good lawyer to tune out all this white noise, to give 
the best reading of what the law is—and not to confuse what the law is 
with what that lawyer, or someone else, thinks the law ought to be.”29 
Second, that a good lawyer can, and should, “separate what are legal 
questions from what are political questions.”30 Attorney General Mu-
kasey’s concern in this regard was largely with unnamed critics of cer-
tain policy decisions who, he asserted, conflated legality with policy 
preference. As he put it, “critics of a policy decision much too rarely 
draw distinctions between whether a course of action is permitted as a 
matter of law, and whether that course of action is prudent as a matter 
of policy.”31
 This concern was supported by a dialectical historical vision. At-
torney General Mukasey adopted a meta-theory, derived from Jack 
Goldsmith,32 of “cycles of timidity and aggression,” which, he said, are 
misunderstood by the public. As he stated, “The narratives produced by 
[post September 11th] investigations were, in many instances, stories of 
missed opportunities. The subtext of these narratives—in fact, at times, 
the text—was that risk-aversion can have grave costs.”33
 The key message about legal culture that Attorney General Mu-
kasey believed was sent to national security lawyers in the immediate 
aftermath of September 11 was clear, bipartisan, and “all but unani-
mous.”34 The message was that legal culture, “was too risk-averse. It 
needed to be more aggressive, it needed to push to the limits of the law, 
to give policymakers and operators the most flexibility possible to con-
front the existential threat of international terrorism.”35 Although it is 
not entirely clear from his commencement address whether Attorney 
General Mukasey actually endorsed this message at the time, one can 
                                                                                                                      
29 Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C. Int'l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 179, 185(2009). 
30 Id. at 180. 
31 Id.  
32 See generally Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside 
the Bush Administration (2007). 
33 Mukasey, supra note 29, at 182. 
34 Id. at 183. 
35 Id. 
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discern from other speeches and writings that he did, and probably still 
does.36
 Attorney General Mukasey went on to state that many critics simply 
do not appreciate the unique difficulties faced by government law-
yers.37 As he said, “Today, many of the senior government lawyers who 
provided legal advice supporting the nation’s most important counter-
terrorism policies have been subjected to relentless public criticism.” 
He worried that, “decisions made in the heat of crisis may be second-
guessed under radically different conditions: in the comparative calm 
of a hearing room or an editorial board room, with the well-known but 
rarely acknowledged benefit of perfect hindsight.”38
 Finally, Attorney General Mukasey argued that the boundaries of 
law are not sufficiently well-defined to provide definitive answers to cer-
tain hard questions (implicitly including waterboarding). He explained 
that: 
The questions are complex because, in this area, the limits of 
executive power are not clearly defined by the Constitution or 
by well-settled precedent; because the laws Congress has en-
acted often speak in general terms and do not provide clear 
answers to the novel questions we confront; and because there 
are few judicial markers to guide the conscientious lawyer.39
Taken together, this is obviously quite a complex package to unravel. 
How, for example, does one reconcile the assertion that the job of the 
good lawyer is simply the workmanlike task of determining “what the 
law is,” while at the same time conceding that the constitutional 
boundaries are unclear, and the guiding “judicial markers” are few?40 
Where, exactly, does policy end and law begin? Is there some sure way 
to determine when a critic is merely disagreeing with policy rather than 
disagreeing with the legality of a particular policy choice? 
 Moreover, cyclical views of history are easily manipulated to achieve 
whatever outcome one seeks to justify. In his well-known poetic repre-
sentation of a cyclical vision, Yeats described, “[t]urning and turning in 
                                                                                                                      
36 See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, The Spirit of Liberty, Wall Street J., May 10, 2004, at 
A16. 
37 This included a particular view of the lawyer/client relationship even in the gov-
ernment context: “A lawyer’s principal duty is to advise his client as to what the best read-
ing of the law is—to define the space in which the client may legally act.” Mukasey, supra 
note 29, at 180. 
38 Id. at 181. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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the widening gyre.”41 A loosening, uncentered, anarchic cycle follows 
where “the falcon cannot hear the falconer,” and finally, “Things fall 
apart; the centre cannot hold.”42 In the legal realm, we must ask hard 
questions: what is the “centre” and how, exactly, should it “hold?” Yeats’ 
dark vision of a “second coming,” we should recall, was not one of glory 
but that of a “rough beast” that “slouches to be born.”43
 The legal and ethical questions are neither hypothetical nor trivial. 
The stakes remain high. The efforts of the Obama administration to ab-
jure the “enemy combatant” label and find a way to close Guantánamo 
Bay signal as much the beginning of a legal and ethical discussion as the 
end of an era. 
 This Symposium took place, and appears in print, at a particularly 
good moment to examine all of these questions. Although we are still at 
war in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are perhaps able to view the threat of 
domestic terrorism with more calmness and clarity than was possible for 
the first few years after September 11. Also, after years of litigation, we 
finally have some definitive guidance from the Supreme Court—in the 
Boumediene, Hamdan, and Hamdi cases—about the extent of the rule of 
law, the flexibility of due process, the strength of the norms of the Ge-
neva Conventions, and the profundity, breadth, and power of the writ of 
habeas corpus.44 We also have considerable guidance from other courts, 
especially those in Europe, and much recent scholarly work. 
 Ultimately, what was at stake when John Yoo first put fingers to 
keyboard were many of the deepest values of our legal system. Thus, 
the assertion that the “task of the good lawyer” is to determine “what 
the law is” invokes deep normative and politico-legal questions.45 As 
Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York in 2004, then-Judge 
Mukasey wrote that, “We are now in a struggle with an extremism that 
expresses itself in the form of terror attacks, and in that we face what is 
probably the gravest threat to this country’s institutions, if not to its physical 
welfare, since the Civil War.”46
                                                                                                                      
41 W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, in Harold Bloom, Yeats 318 (1972). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
45 Mukasey, supra note 29, at 185. 
46 Mukasey, The Spirit of Liberty, supra note 36 (emphasis added). In his conclusion, 
then-Judge Mukasey also wrote, “[T]he hidden message in the structure of the Constitu-
tion—is that the government it establishes is entitled, at least in the first instance, to re-
ceive from its citizens the benefit of the doubt.” Id. 
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 There is no question that many shared such sentiments. As a re-
sult, they tended to defer to the executive on a wide range of issues that 
could require legal analysis.47 Many others found such assessments puz-
zling and troubling, both as a matter of empirical fact and because of 
where they could lead us.48 The basic political disagreement is essen-
tially the same as that seen by Hannah Arendt in the context of totali-
tarianism: “The greatest danger of recognizing totalitarianism as the 
curse of the century would be an obsession with it to the extent of be-
coming blind to the numerous small and not so small evils with which 
the road to hell is paved.”49
 Attorney General Mukasey would likely view such sentiments as 
naïve. Clearly, if one defines al Qaeda as a graver threat to the United 
States than were the forces of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the 
former Soviet Union, then one might well countenance waterboarding. 
One might even thank those who were involved, and support their 
right to raise a “necessity defense” if prosecuted. Is this the same as in-
terpreting waterboarding and other such practices as legal? 
 It was to such questions that our panelists turned their attention.50 
The articles published herein reflect a wide range of approaches. Major 
Christopher Shaw, a Judge Advocate with the U.S. Marine Corps, ana-
                                                                                                                      
47 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Lib-
erty, and the Courts 43 (2007) (invoking Carl Schmitt to argue that, in times of emer-
gency, the executive must curtail liberty to ensure security and the courts should not inter-
fere.) 
48 As David Cole and Jules Lobel have argued: 
Our long-term security turns not on “going on offense” by locking up thou-
sands of “suspected terrorists” who turn out to have no connection to terror-
ism; nor on forcing suspects to bark like dogs, urinate and defecate on them-
selves, and endure sexual humiliation; nor on attacking countries that have 
not threatened to attack us. Security rests not on exceptionalism and double 
standards but on a commitment to fairness, justice and the rule of law. The 
rule of law in no way precludes a state from defending itself from terrorists 
but requires that it do so within constraints. And properly understood, those 
constraints are assets, not obstacles. 
David Cole & Jules Lobel, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror, Nation, Sept. 24, 2007, at 11. 
See generally David Cole & Jules Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free: Why America Is Losing 
the War on Terror (2007). 
49 Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954, at 271–72 ( Jerome Kohn 
ed., 1994). 
50 Andrew Tarsy, the former New England Regional Director of the Anti-Defamation 
League, Dean John Hutson of Franklin Pierce Law School, former Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Navy, and Professor George Brown of Boston College Law School also partici-
pated in the Symposium, though they were not able to submit articles for publication. 
Additionally, Professor Allan Ryan, a former Marine Corps judge advocate and professor at 
Boston College Law School, served as a moderator. 
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lyzes the clear prohibitions against torture in both domestic and inter-
national law. He argues that a lack of leadership and clear policy al-
lowed legal violations to occur. As he writes, “Although definitions are 
significant, leadership, policies and ultimately a nation’s commitment 
to humane treatment are primary.”51 More broadly, Professor Lorenzo 
Zucca of King’s College London suggests that, “Europe has something 
to teach the United States.” He writes that, “ethical lawyers should seek 
to strike a balance between these competing interests in good faith. 
They should be prepared . . . to face judicial scrutiny and . . . justify 
their decisions. They must believe in the rule of law at any cost.”52
 Professor Kent Greenfield suggests that “we live in a time in which 
ethical rationalization deserves close scrutiny.”53 In this regard, he dis-
agreed strongly with Attorney General Mukasey. As he writes, “our 
problem . . . is not that we don’t understand but that we understand all 
too well the illegal conduct that has been perpetrated in our name.”54 
This is not because law is simple, but because it is complex. That very 
complexity, however, demands that, “when gaps must be filled, there is 
no neutral way to fill them that avoids the need for political, philoso-
phical, or moral justification.”55
 William J. Dunn, an attorney with an extensive background as an 
intelligence analyst, offers a wide-ranging and thoughtful analysis of the 
role of government lawyers. Questioning how much that role ought to 
change in various “cycles,” Dunn writes that the, “overarching lesson 
[is] to moderate governmental action through counsel at all stages . . . 
to eliminate the unnecessary peaks of aggression and the perilous val-
leys of risk-averse action.”56 Indeed, he concludes that, “it is the tough 
questions and the courageous answers that define our profession.”57
 U.S. District Judge William G. Young, who presided over the “shoe-
bomber” case in Boston, writes passionately about the declining role of 
the jury in American law. As he puts it, “the justice of the many cannot 
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be left to the judgment of the few.”58 Although he does not conclude 
that the authors of the torture memos should face juries and make 
their best arguments there, he does decry the “massive drift away from 
rigorous fact-finding in open court.”59
 Finally, in a thoughtful and provocative article, Professor Gabriella 
Blum develops an occasionally complementary, but also somewhat con-
trary vision. She suggests that lawyers have assumed or have been given 
too much authority by governments. Further, she argues that, “without 
inquiring about the responsibility of the client receiving the legal ad-
vice, our normative and prescriptive view of government lawyering is 
seriously lacking.”60 In a sort of critical homage to Alexis de Tocqueville 
(albeit with a German phraseology), Professor Blum writes that in our 
über-legalistic culture, “if a lawyer advises her client that a policy is illegal, 
the client hears ‘it is evil.’ No one wants to be an evil-doer.”61 Upon 
reading this, I was reminded of Jürgen Habermas’s assertion regarding 
the invasion of Iraq: 
There have been, since [the acceptance of the UN Charter], 
no more just and unjust wars, only legal or illegal ones, justi-
fied or unjustified under international law. One must bear in 
mind this enormous advance in the rights revolution in order 
to realize the radical breach that the Bush administration has 
wrought. . . . In the rhetoric of legitimation, there is in no ‘re-
alistic’ redemption of ‘idealistic’ notions.62
Professor Blum’s argument is not that law is irrelevant. Indeed, she 
notes critically how, “Bush administration lawyers . . . felt they had to 
justify any government action under legal terms, for fear of tying the 
government’s hands. By doing so, they legalized illegal actions.”63 Her 
point is not even that law should not matter or not matter much. It is 
out of deep respect for law that she ultimately asserts that elected gov-
ernment officials may sometimes decide, for reasons they believe to be 
good and sufficient, to violate the laws. In those rare cases, however, 
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they are not absolved of responsibility. They should, “make the deci-
sions and face the consequences.”64
Conclusion 
God, when he gave me strength, to show withal 
How slight the gift was, hung it in my hair. 
—John Milton65
 One of the most important purposes of law is to restrain the power 
and violence over which the state, as Weber argued, has a legitimate 
monopoly.66 To accomplish this, law must be both retrospective (by ju-
ries and judges) and predictive. The discipline of law is simultaneously 
a rhetorically constructive and an analytically de-constructive enter-
prise. It can be grandly eloquent and maddeningly technical as it helps 
to “constitute” the social order, to provide the bones and sinews around 
which the blood of society may flow and upon which a civilization may 
rest with at least a modicum of value-laden stability.67 Ronald Dworkin 
once famously described law as a sort of chain novel, written by many 
authors over time. Its narrative must be coherent, even as its narrators 
come and go.68 Of course, much more then mere coherence is re-
quired. The “constitution” of law is inevitably situated within a consid-
erably less fluid system, from which it derives much of its legitimacy and 
against which its use and its misuse may be tested.69
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 Law is also analytic: much of its function is to parse words, to elu-
cidate and manipulate fine distinctions. This necessary, but secondary 
and often tedious enterprise puts obvious pressure on the grander con-
structive legal ideal. It is often disparaged.70 Indeed, the dangers of 
formalistic analysis, if unmoored from value-based discourse or if used 
to mask values, are a staple of modern legal realist thought. Too insular 
a deductive method risks what Felix Cohen famously called “transcen-
dental nonsense.”71 It is underlying principles and policies, “practical 
questions of value or of positive fact,” not abstract linguistic formula-
tions that must inform our analysis.72
 The ultimate problem is how far one can go in this direction with-
out abandoning the very idea of law as an autonomous or even a semi-
autonomous category of thought. The current torture debate, however, 
does not push this far if one sees a consonance between the legal and 
normative principles at issue. We can and we must maintain a richer 
theory of interpretation, which takes into account pre-interpretive legal 
traditions, social norms, and moral concepts. It is from these sub-strata 
that we can write the best contemporary versions of our constantly 
evolving legal novel. To be sure, this method, if too loosely undertaken, 
may render legal interpretation a rather shaky enterprise. When it 
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Id. at 820 (emphasis omitted from original). 
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comes to the role of judges, one runs the risk of being thrashed by 
Richard Posner as advocating rule by “enlightened despots.”73
 Attorney General Mukasey has maintained that “[r]easonable 
people can disagree, and have disagreed, about these matters.”74 That 
may be true, depending upon which matters are at issue, but he surely 
would not suggest that all interpretations are equally sound. Some of 
his public agonies75 seemed to derive in part from professional role 
tensions, though he has denied this, saying, “I wear one hat. It says at-
torney general of the United States. There are a number of duties un-
der that, but as far as I’m concerned, there is no divided responsibility 
or divided loyalty. There is one responsibility.”76
 One need only read the mission statement of the DOJ,77 however, 
to see why the “one hat” model is potentially problematic. On the one 
hand, the agency’s role is executive and protective. But consider the 
statement’s very first lines: “To enforce the law and defend the interests 
of the United States according to the law,” and its ending, “to ensure fair 
and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.” Indeed, an 
inscription on the side of the DOJ building in Washington, D.C. states 
the ultimate duty still more clearly: “No free government can survive 
that is not based on the supremacy of the law.” This may tell us some-
thing profoundly important about how to respond to apparent criminal 
violations of law by U.S. agents, how to analyze legal questions regard-
ing torture, and how to define the “task of the good lawyer.”78
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